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MANNING THE FORCE
Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II

OK, so the Total Force is being expanded. What will that expansion look like? Colonel
(Ret.) John Bonin of the U.S. Army War College argues that restricting the increase to all
“trigger-pullers” is the wrong answer. In the long run, he is clearly correct, but maybe
there is another dimension that bears consideration—the Trainees, Transients, Holdees,
and Students (TTHS) limits.
Army Force Generation may or may not work once the Total Force expands, but as we
better comprehend the nature of the fight in which we are likely to be engaged, it may be
more important than ever to make time and space to allow the Soldier-leaders in this force
to study, think, and “waste time” doing both. Current officer, noncommissioned officer
(NCO), troop ratios do not allow this beyond a very limited scope. Further, it has almost
always been the case that real war is much more junior leader intensive than Tables of
Organization and Equipment have ever allowed, and urban combat, which is
progressively becoming the norm, is even more so. As a result, officer/NCO percentages
in the force should increase significantly. In the long run, this will cause difficulties in
career progression, but that is partly a matter of expectation management. This is also not
a TTHS account issue directly, but the two feed off each other—the relative numbers of
officers and NCOs has to increase to meet the Army’s future demands and may best be
met through judicious expansion of the TTHS account.
The hard truth is that the Army needs more junior and intermediate leaders at almost
every echelon. It needs them to be in school—formal military schools as both instructors
and students; in advanced civil schools (universities), and on internships across a much
expanded range of disciplines. It needs them in a broader range of positions within the
military establishment, and here I am thinking more of mid- and senior grade. It needs
them to be allowed increased recovery time from repetitive combat tours.
Army officers need to perform internships at the Department of State (DoS). Army
officers need to perform internships at the United Nations, Department of the Treasury,
Commerce, Justice, Transportation, and a host of Nongovernment Organizations (NGOs)
all of which will be players in implementing Department of Defense (DoD) Directive
3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations. It is not likely that DoS, or any of the other departments will ever be allowed to
expand their numbers to be able to meet the Stability and Reconstruction requirements.
Strict interpretation of DoD 3000.05 makes it essential that the Army have a stable of
officers capable of performing liaison at a minimum, and augmenting or, worst case,
performing the duties of DoS and other agency representatives to meet the mission
requirements.
A quick review of the seldom read, mostly unknown Army Green Book, Soldiers
Become Governors, strongly suggests the Army must be able to come up with Soldierleaders with a host of other than traditional military talents. This cannot be accomplished

unless space is made, institutionally, for a higher percentage of officers to be absent from
operational units, to be in training, and to be on detail to other than direct military duties.
The institution needs more officers of high talent on “the Bench” to be able to carry the
present burden. If the operating tempo (OPTEMPO) does not change significantly, more
of the same will only generate burnout. Graduate school must once again become possible
without causing career death. Internships must be expanded across all relevant
government departments and even into selected NGOs. The headlong pursuit of cultural
studies cannot be restricted to classrooms. Immersion, and the accompanying honing of
language proficiency, is possible to a degree in the classroom, but there is simply no
substitute for living in the culture. That means time in the culture and out of the military
mainstream—a program already underway on a very limited basis for U.S. Military
Academy graduates.
The concept of creating officers who are ”pentathletes” further reinforces this idea. To
become a pentathlete, a person must devote most of his/her time to training and
education to become expert in each of the five categories—one cannot compete as a
pentathlete by training on weekends or periodically between other jobs. Pentathletes
require focused engagement in their required disciplines and that translates to time and
extraordinary administrative support to allow them to train and develop with minimal
distractions.
The looming requirement, noted above, is to do something substantive about DoD
Directive 3000.05. If the Army is going to be serious about adhering to this directive, a
significant amount of training and educating will be required to build a credible
capability. There are several good reasons to do so, entirely aside from the fact that it is a
directive and is supposed to be obeyed. The Army should vigorously pursue effective
implementation of this directive, if for no other reason than it already possesses the
essential infrastructural base in the Maneuver Enhancement formations currently
building. These modular structures will necessarily possess an engineering base element
to which additional infrastructure-development capabilities may be added. Funding to
support the development of these brigade structures should be viewed by DoD as
investing in a sure two-for-one process. These organizations will be capable of meeting the
operational support requirements of the combatant commanders in peacetime, and in
combat operations as initially intended, but may also become the base organizations
responsible for executing DoD Directive 3000.05 missions. But development of this
mandated capability should not be seen as a purely engineering exercise—reconstruction
certainly; the other portions, however, tend to be Soldier-centric and, like Urban Combat,
are NCO and junior officer-centric. To fulfill the mandate of the directive, the Army will
have to develop broad expertise in civil infrastructure functions. Arguably, this too can be
viewed as a “two-fer.” Soldier-leaders acquire the expertise necessary to reestablish civil
infrastructure and administration during that uncertain period between the time matters
are in flux and when it becomes safe enough to bring in civilian contractors; and these
Soldier-leaders will acquire the ability to perform serious urban infrastructure analysis as
an intelligence function should it later be required.
I am not talking about resurrecting Emory Upton’s “Expansible Army” concept,
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although there are parallels. That we need more capable junior to mid-grade officers and
NCOs is hardly worth debating. That we need to accept and adapt to the obvious
interagency, urban management, and other DoD Directive 3000.05 requirements follows,
and that we can get double return from our investment should make the adjustment more
palatable. The existing TTHS account limitations are based on an Army structure and task
orientation that no longer exist. What a reasonable percentage should be remains to be
worked out between the Army G-3 and the G-1 once they have a grasp on what the
changed situation requires. In the end, an increased TTHS account will provide the Army
the ability to achieve: desired cultural depth through schooling and on the ground
experience, DoD Directive 3000.05 capabilities across a broad range of disciplines, the
depth to conduct prolonged urban combat operations, broader service, and joint tour
experience, adequate between tour recovery time, and potentially, an expansion base for
any larger conflict that might come along. We must have the time to develop our leaders
to be able to master our new situation and since we cannot manufacture time, we must
accept “inefficient use” of manpower spaces in an expanded TTHS account to make time
available.
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